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UNSPOKEN DIALOGUES 
– Human Interactions with Material Structures
This textual delineation will pro-vide an overview of the incentives, problems, 
and methodological questions 
of the project Unspoken Dialogues (hereafter UD). A 
reason for concern is the present focus on quality deter-
minators in architecture. The particular authority of cer-
tainty, predictability, and accountability on this issue 
can be seen to subsume architectural decision-ma-
king to explication, incidentally under objective rule. 
Unintentionally, therefore, the determining of quality 
promotes fidelity towards abandonment of values that 
cannot be explicated. At the same time it is clear that 
the value the built environment has for us depends 
also on qualities that are indeterminable and inexp-
licable (e.g. the notion of home.) I will argue that our 
possibility for addressing questions of value and qua-
lity in architectural decision-making depends on a 
better understanding of the nature of the interactions 
between person and object. UD will contribute here th-
rough a phenomenological and aesthetic examination 
of such interactions, with focus on the role and nature 
of their dynamics1, and with the hypothesis that the 
dynamic nature of the interaction process may be deci-
sive for aesthetic experience in architecture. Based in 
architecture itself, and within the framework of Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty’s existential phenomenology, I will appo-
se the subjective perspective of phenomenology and 
the objective perspective of science2. The purpose of 
this unlikely apposition is, faced with a research object 
that appears elusive (we are aware of it, but it is not vi-
sible) and that escapes empirical evidence, to elicit its 
nature as appearance within the relief3 that the apposi-
tion presents. From this appearance, the nature of the 
interactions can then be described as a phenomenon, 
which then, on the intersubjective level, will be discus-
sed and interpreted in relation to alternative theories of 
aesthetic experience. So, rather than postulating mu-
tual exclusiveness between the perspectives of science 
and phenomenology, they are seen as interdependent 
in their contribution to revealing the nature of the re-
search object. It is my aim that UD can contribute to 
overcome the subjective-objective cleavage that se-
ems to prevail in architectural theory. That it further 
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can be understood as a contribution to the practise of 
architecture, in the light of Merleau-Ponty’s phenome-
nology, in its stress on the epistemological importance 
of presence (not a presence of essence but of meaning) 
and meaning that unfolds in the reciprocal process of 
expression-and-perception – in the Unspoken Dialo-
gues of architecture.
Architecture and the Research Problem
The fundamental thesis is that of architecture as a li-
ving, evolving thing. Our culture’s striving towards ci-
vilization is manifested in the places, houses and cities 
that it creates. As well as providing a protective cara-
pace [outer shell], these structures also carry symbolic 
value, and can be seen as being continuous with and 
emerging from the life of those who inhabit the built 
environment.4 
Gordon Pask here frames architecture and architect 
within their social and cultural context, emphasizing 
how our lives are inseparable from the things we crea-
te and how we might see experience and production 
of architecture to be interwoven.5 The premiss, thus, is 
a non-reductive view of architecture, where we are in 
a continuous relation with the world, or rather, to say it 
with Merleau-Ponty: there is reciprocity between the 
world and us. It is my thesis that exactly some of the 
issues that cannot be translated to explicit and deter-
minable concepts might most potently distinguish ob-
jects of architecture as the carriers of symbolic value in 
Pask’s model and as meaning-giving relations in our 
lives with them.
The clarity and richness of an aesthetic experience 
often stands in sharp contrast to the theories trying 
to describe or explain it. The issue in UD is not to make 
judgements about objects of art or architecture, but 
rather to understand the interactions between person 
and object and what it is about these interactions that 
might make aesthetic experience in architecture pos-
sible.6
Field of Research
Extensive research has been and is done on the expe-
rience of architecture. The focus has been on struc-
ture (form, materials, colours etc.), on placement wit-
hin existing built and natural environments, on physi-
cal use, on psychological affect, art historical reception, 
etc. UD will add another dimension to these through 
the investigation of the development of experience as 
experiencing, seeing interactions between person and 
object as dialogues, as processes evolving in time, with 
focus on the nature and role of their dynamics and with 
the possibility for other kinds of knowing.7 The discipli-
nes that could contribute to a better understanding of 
the interactions between person and object are many 
and diverse. Four main criteria have been decisive in 
selecting the disciplines that are included in UD.8 The 
main disciplines chosen are psychology, physiology, 
and mathematics, in addition to a phenomenological 
investigation. I will take the field of relevant disciplines, 
the field of research, literally as a field and propose a 
map serving as a theoretical arena for negotiations 
and discourse.9
The Map – Theoretical Arena for Discourse
The red centre denotes the research object, that 
which is between person and object. Person and ob-
ject are denoted in diametrical distance on the rim of 
the red centre circle and the relation between them is 
the red field. The dark green ring cir-cumscribing the 
red denotes architecture itself as a particular level of 
investigation. It circumscribes the research problem im-
mediately because the problem is an architectural pro-
blem. The next two rings denote the epistemological 
and the ontological levels, the blue and the yellow re-
spectively. The disciplines are denoted as enlightened 
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sectors on the map. Only one of the sectors, architec-
tural theory, reaches through architecture. The reason 
for this is that the perspective taken in UD is from in-
side architecture. Circumscribing the yellow ontological 
level is the lived world. The placement of UD within the 
framework of phenomenology changes this map. To 
phenomenology, the lived world is fundamentally that 
which justifies and gives meaning, also to science. The 
consequence for the map is that there is a connection 
between the research object and the lived world. This 
means that the outer rim of the map folds in on the re-
search object and so forms a torus, or a doughnut. For 
Merleau-Ponty, with his epistemological thesis of the 
primacy of perception and the correlate ontological 
thesis of the primacy of phenomena, this means that 
lived experience can be the fundamental justification of 
knowledge. For UD this change in the map means that 
there is the possibility to appose the phenomenological 
perspective and the objective perspective of science.
One Strategy – Three Ways of Thinking
While the map denotes the arena for discourse, the field 
of research and the levels of investigation, the met-
hods now become strategies for moving in the map. For 
UD there are two alternative methods, depending on 
how we see the problem. 
A problem is a question which I pose to myself and then 
resolve by considering different givens which are external 
to me. […] in philosophy we must work out a very singular 
type of problem. In these problems, the one who poses 
them is also engaged. This person is not a spectator in rela-
tion to the problem, but is rather caught up in the matter, 
which for him defines the mystery.10 
One approach then, where the researcher is a spectator 
to the problem, would see knowledge from the relevant 
disciplines as “givens” that might be joined to solve the 
problem or parts thereof. The second possibility is a 
philosophical approach, where the problem is a singu-
lar problem that only can be posed from an engaged 
point of view. I have chosen transdisciplinarity11 in the 
former and existential phenomenology, particularly 
as developed by Merleau-Ponty, in the latter.12 An ex-
haustive treatment of the questions posed by UD, I ar-
gue, requires the mobilization of both these methods 
within a third way of thinking which is the apposition 
of the two.
Apposition and the Relief
The question is now how the two approaches above to-
gether might contribute to clarification. I have announ-
ced the intention to appose the subjective perspective 
of phenomenology and the objective perspective of 
science. This apposition is not a third method to be 
applied. It is, rather, a way of seeing in order to describe 
the two perspectives together. The purpose of this un-
likely apposition then, is to consider the relationship 
between the disclosures of science and the elucida-
tion of phenomenological descriptions with the thesis 
that between them they might yield a phenomenon 
that is still situated within architecture. The occasion 
for this elaborate intermediary, before we can come to 
reflect on the issue and discuss our findings in relation 
to other theories, is that the two perspectives cannot be 
compared directly because they are fundamentally dif-
ferent. We must therefore establish a common ground 
between them.
For an apposition to be meaningful it must be some-
thing more than mere juxtaposition, something more inti-
mate must lie between the elements apposed. The thesis 
above was that the two perspectives are different ways 
of seeing the same research problem, as problem and 
as mystery. According to Merleau-Ponty their common 
ground is the perceived world: 
The perceived world is the always presupposed founda-
tion of all rationality, all value and all existence. This the-
sis [the primacy of perception] does not destroy either 
rationality or the absolute. It only tries to bring them 
down to earth.13 
With this then, we can establish a common ground, 
but an apposition still has another request from the 
apposed: It implies interrogation, a sort of questioning 
and contributing in making the issue more precise. It is 
in the nexus then, of their common ground in percep-
tion, that the apposition of the subjective perspective 
of phenomenology and the objective perspective of 
science can be seen to build a relief. What is absent in 
each of them thematically is “filled in” by the other, ac-
commodated in the shadows of the relief, in the sha-
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dows of their methodological differences. In scientific 
disclosure it is de facto absence of that which is parti-
cular to individual subjective experience, e.g. what 
it feels like to experience in a certain way; in the phe-
nomenological description it is absence as “hidden,” 
of some necessary conditions for the development of 
the experiencing process, e.g. internal bodily proces-
ses of which we cannot be conscious.14 The relief, thus, 
is our alternative to choosing between perceptual faith 
and objective analysis; and it is in this way that the re-
lief enables a non-reductive description of the nature 
of the research object as a phenomenon.
Because the relief can accommodate absence as well 
as presence, it leaves open the question of aesthetic 
experience. This is important because the hypothesis 
does not postulate an ætiological examination into 
what might cause aesthetic experience, but to investi-
gate the nature of the dynamics and its role as a possible 
finity between ethics and aesthetics as this relates to 
questions of value and quality in important ways.15
Conclusively, UD must be seen as what is called foun-
dation research, and its main contribution in this sense 
lies in that it can be the ground for further research. 
It can e.g. be seen to contribute to the possibility for 
describing the limit of determinability in architecture. 
It might be possible to describe this limit in such a way 
that it explains why qualities that are indeterminable 
and inexplicable must be included explicitly in discus-
sions on issues of value and quality, but that attempts 
to translate them to determinable and explicit concepts 
frequently destroy their nature. These issues of quality 
often pertain to the personal contribution and respon-
sibility of architects. They are fragile in the sense that 
freedom is fragile; they require workable “spaces” within 
which they can be developed. But they are also strong in 
the sense that freedom is strong; they carry the power 
that enables us to act humanly.
Notes
1. By seeing interactions between person and object as a pro-
cesses, one can speak of their dynamics in the sense of 
development of experience in time.
2.  To appose is away of making more precise by ranging 
side by side or putting one thing to another.
3. By relief I mean, metaphorically, the concept in the plas-
tic arts.
4. Gordon Pask, “Foreword,” in John Frazer, An Evolutio-
nary Architecture (London: AA Publications 1995), p. 6.
5. For an outline of this argument, see: Helene Stub, “Brid-
ging Lived World and Modelled World with Personal 
Experience,” in Ethics in Architecture: Architectural Edu-
cation in the Epoch of Virtuality, Transactions on Archi-
tectural Education No. 08, ed. Anne Elisabeth Toft (Aar-
hus: European Association for Architectural Education 
2000), p. 90.
6. When I speak of aesthetic experience I refer to the original 
philosophical meaning of aesthetic where it was distin-
guished between aistheta, meaning things perceptible 
by the senses; or, perceptive, sharp in the senses, as oppo-
sed to noeta, things thinkable or immaterial. With expe-
rience it is important to unfold the inherent ambiguity of 
the word in English. I refer here to the distinction made by 
Hans-Georg Gadamer between experience as Erfahrung 
and Erlebnis. The experience of architecture, I suggest, 
is different from the experience of a work of art in that it 
can be seen to be both Erlebnis and Erfahrung.
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condition for aesthetic experience in architecture.
Reflection, Analysis, and Discussion
Within the delineated conceptual and methodological 
framework above, the issues of the nature of the dyna-
mics will be discussed extensively. The nature of the 
dynamics, then, appearing as a phenomenon in the 
relief above, can be seen to be an architectural pheno-
menon because the research problem is already situa-
ted within architecture, as it became clear in the map 
above. Having thus moved from a research problem 
that appeared as an elusive “mystery” to the description 
of it as a phenomenon, it becomes possible to discuss 
and interpret it in relation to alternative theories of ar-
chitecture and aesthetic experience, including the af-
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7. E.g. knowing someone as in “I know my friend,” or Micha-
el Polanyi’s “personal knowledge” (“tacit knowing”).
8. First, vocational relevancy through the role played by the 
disciplines in my seeing the possibility for the hypothesis 
and in formulating it; second, traditional influence and 
hegemony; third, their persistence in relevancy throug-
hout the research; and, fourth, their relevancy as historic 
roots to the framework I have chosen for the research, 
the existential phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty.
9. It is important to emphasize that the map is not a model 
of how things are, but a theoretical mapping of the levels 
of inquiry as coloured circles and the disciplines as en-
lightened sectors.
10. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “The Philosophy of Existence,” 
in Texts and Dialogues: On Philosophy, Politics, and Cul-
ture, eds. Hugh J. Silverman and James Barry, Jr., trans. 
Michael B. Smith et al. (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humani-
ties Press 1996, reprint), p. 133.
11. In difference to interdisciplinarity, which is concerned 
with the transfer of methods from one discipline to an-
other, “transdisciplinarity concerns that which is at once 
between the disciplines, across different disciplines, and 
beyond all discipline.” Basarab Nicolescu, Extract from 
the book Transdisciplinarity – A Manifesto, trans. Karen-
Claire Voss (Paris: International Center for Transdiscipli-
nary Research 1999; http://perso.club-internet.fr/nicol/
ciret/).
12. Phenomenology , generally, is the in-depth study of how 
things appear to consciousness. It studies our individual 
subjective perspectives. The appropriateness of pheno-
menology for UD is particularly clear in Merleau-Ponty’s 
existential phenomenology. For him the basic task of 
phenomenology is to overcome the limitations of de-
terminant and objective investigations by describing the 
way experience develops. Merleau-Ponty has his own 
kind of reduction: From the objective to the subjective; 
from the abstract to the concrete. Throughout his work 
his methodological genius was the way he combined 
phenomenology with psychology.
13. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Primacy of Perception, ed. 
James M. Edie (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University 
Press 1964, eighth paperback printing 1989), p. 13.
14. These processes are “hidden” in phenomenological 
descriptions because, although we cannot be conscious 
of them separately, these processes are part of our being 
alive, which we are indeed conscious of.
15. For an outline of this argument, see: Helene Stub, in Ethics 
in Architecture: Architectural Education in the Epoch of 
Virtuality, pp. 85–94.
